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Fairless: Fairless: Participant Status

Notes
The Participant Status of Sole
Shareholders under ERISA
Kwatcher v. MassachusettsService Employees Pension Fund'
George Kwatcher began working as a window-washer in 1934.2 By
1948, he was the sole shareholder of the window-washing corporation, Astor
Window Cleaning Company (Astor). From 1973 to 1982, Astor made
contributions to the Massachusetts Service Employees Pension Fund (Fund)
on behalf of Mr. Kwatcher.4 The Fund is a private retirement savings plan
regulated under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA). 5 Mr. Kwatcher retired from the window-washing trade in 1982, and
began receiving retirement payments from the Fund.6 In 1983, the Fund
discontinued payments, determining that Mr. Kwatcher did not qualify as a
participant under the plan because of his status as an employer. 7 Mr.
Kwatcher filed an action for continued payment of retirement savings
benefits.8 The First Circuit Court of Appeals, in Kwatcher v. Massachusetts
Service Employees Pension Fund,9 denied Mr. Kwatcher's claim to payments.10

1. 879 F.2d 957 (1st Cir. 1985).
2. Id. at 958.
3. Id. In 1981, Mr. Kwatcher created AWC, Inc., a successor corporation to
Astor. Id. at 958 n.1. Throughout this Note, AWC, Inc., and Astor Window Cleaning
Co., will both be referred to as Astor.
4. Id.

5. Pub. L No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (ERISA's labor provisions are codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982)).
6. Kwatcher, 879 F.2d at 958.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. 879 F.2d 957 (1st Cir. 1989).
10. Id. at 963. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's granting of the
Fund's motion for summary judgment.
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The First Circuit held that Mr. Kwatcher was an employer under ERISA
and that he was therefore ineligible to participate in the Fund's plan as an
employee." A California federal district court addressed the same issue in
June of 1988, in Dodd v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co."2 The
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of California held that the sole
is eligible to participate in an ERISA pension
shareholder of a corporation
13
plan as an "employee.'
This Note examines the ambiguous treatment of dual-status individuals
under ERISA.14 A "dual-status" individual is an individual who qualifies as
both an employer, by virtue of owning controlling shares of a corporation, and
as an employee, by virtue of working for the corporation and earning
compensation for services rendered. The Kwatcher court fails to recognize
that ERISA does not address the treatment of a dual-status individual. 15 The
court then proceeds to develop an argument for its conclusion that ERISA
prohibits a dual-status individual from participation in a pension plan. This
Note examines three arguments of the court. First, the Kwatcher court
supports its interpretation of the applicable statutory language with reference
to 29 C.F.R. section 2510.3-3(c). 1 6 Second, the court finds policy rationales
to support its conclusion that dual-status individuals were not meant to be
afforded protection as participants under ERISA."7 Finally, after determining
that Mr. Kwatcher is an employer under ERISA, the court applies the antiinurement regulations to prohibit Mr. Kwatcher's qualification as a participant.18

11. Id. The argument that Mr. Kwatcher cannot be a participant because he is an
employer is attacked later in this Note. See infra text accompanying notes 131-50.
The logic of the syllogism employed by the First Circuit runs as follows: An
employer cannot be a participant under the terms of ERISA. Mr. Kwatcher is an
employer; therefore, Mr. Kwatcher cannot be a participant. It is the proposition that
an employer cannot be a participant under the terms of ERISA which is attacked
herein.
12. 688 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Cal. 1988).
13. Id. at 571. The Dodd opinion is discussed in Part III of this Note. See infra
notes 69-87 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 69-90 and accompanying text.
15. See Kwatcher, 879 F.2d at 959.
16. This Note examines this regulation and its application to the facts of Kwatcher
at text accompanying infra notes 91-101. For a discussion of the First Circuit's
interpretation of the regulation, see Kwatcher, 879 F.2d at 961-62; see also infra notes
48-53 and accompanying text.
17. See Kwatcher, 879 F.2d at 960-61; see also infra notes 102-30 and
accompanying text.
18. Kwatcher, 879 F.2d at 959-60; see infra notes 131-50 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the scope of the anti-inurement regulation.
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I. ERISA
In 1974, Congress enacted ERISA to regulate the private pension
system. 9 The private pension system at that time covered about one-half of
the United States industrial work force. 20 ERISA legislation is divided into
four titles.21 Title I encompasses the congressional response to concern over
the protection of employee benefit rights. 22
Under Title I, a person is eligible to participate in a pension plan if he
or she is an employee and if he or she is a participant or beneficiary within
the meaning of ERISA. The question addressed in Kwatcher is whether a sole
shareholder may be a "participant" within the meaning of ERISA.
The 'starting point for determining whether an individual qualifies for
pension payments under the structure of ERISA is section 3.2 3 Section 3

19. A 1964 report concluded there was a strong public interest in the regulation
of the private pension plan system based on four findings:
(1) [private pension plans] represent a major element in theeconomic
security of millions of American workers and their families, (2) they are a
significant, growing source of economic and financial power, (3)they affect
the mobility of the American labor force, and (4) they are subsidized by the
general body of taxpayers by virtue of the special tax treatment accorded
them.
D. MCGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 34 (3d ed. 1975).
20. S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 4838, 4839.

21. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, PUB. L. No. 93-406,
§ 1, 1974 CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (88 Stat.) 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1001

(1982)).
22. Id. See McGill, supra note 19, at 37. Federal jurisdiction over a private
pension plan depends upon the commerce clause. See ERISA §§ 3, 4, 29 U.S.C. §§

1002, 1003 (Supp. 1989). Also note, however, that federal jurisdiction over plans, as
far as the regulation of plans as "qualified" for purposes of receiving tax benefits,
depends on the taxing power of Congress. Under § 4 of ERISA, the regulations apply

to a plan "if it is established or maintained ... by any employer engaged in commerce
or in any industry or activity affecting commerce; or... by any employee organization

or organizations representing employees engaged in commerce or in any industry or
activity affecting commerce." ERISA § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)(1), (2) (1982).

23. ERISA § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (Supp. 1989).
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contains definitions for Title I of ERISA. 24 To qualify for benefits, a person
must be a plan "participant."' Section 3(7) defines "participant" as
any employee or former employee of an employer, or any member or
former member of an employee organization, who is or may become
eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan
which covers employees of such member or members of such organization,
26
or whose beneficiaries may be eligible to receive such benefit.
The status of a participant is dependent on a person's qualification as an
27
employee. An "employee" is "any individual employed by an emPloyer."
Section 3(5) defines "employer" as any "person" who acts in the interest of an
employer.'
ERISA provides no guidelines for when a sole shareholder of a
corporation may be considered an employee for determining whether the sole
shareholder is a participant. For the question of the status of an individual
who is the sole shareholder of a corporation and an employee of the
corporation, ERISA is ambiguous.

II. KWATCHER V. MASSACHUSETTS SERVICE
EMPLOYEES PENSION FUND
From 1948 until 1982, Mr. Kwatcher worked as a window-washer for
Astor. Mr. Kwatcher, as the sole shareholder and chief officer of Astor,
executed contracts, hired and fired employees and disciplined employees.2 9
As chief executive officer, Mr. Kwatcher represented Astor in collective

24. ERISA §§ 1-514, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982). Section 3 is titled
"Definitions," and begins with the language, "[flor the purposes of this subchapter."
ERISA § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (Supp. 1989). Subchapter I of ERISA is entitled
"Protection of Employee Benefit Rights." ERISA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. 1989).
25. ERISA § 502(1)(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1451(a)(1) (1982). Further, to sue for the
payment of benefits in federal court, the person must be a participant. ERISA § 502,
29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1986).
26. ERISA § 3(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (Supp. 1989).
27. ERISA § 3(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (Supp. 1989).
28. ERISA § 3(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5) (Supp. 1989). The Kwatcher court was
able to point to Mr. Kwatcher's participation in the collective bargaining agreement
which resulted in the creation of the Fund as "acting ...in the interest of an
employer." Kwatcher, 879 F.2d at 960. A person is defined in ERISA § 3(9) as "an
individual, partnership, joint venture, corporation, mutual company, joint stock
company, trust, estate, union corporation organization, association, or employee
organization." ERISA § 3(9), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(9) (Supp. 1989).
29. Kwatcher, 879 F.2d at 958.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/6
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bargaining agreements with the Service Employees International Union.3 °
At the same time, Mr. Kwatcher was a member of that union.31
In 1973, the Service Employees International Union and the Maintenance
Contractors of New England, an employer organization, entered into an
agreement creating the Fund, a pension fund for the benefit of union
employees.32 Astor contributed to the Fund on behalf of Mr. Kwatcher.33
In July of 1982, Mr. Kwatcher retiredY3
Mr. Kwatcher received pension payments from the Fund until 1983. At
that time, the Fund determined that Mr. Kwatcher was a business owner, and
therefore an employer. The Fund argued Mr. Kwatcher could not participate
in the plan because he was an employer.3 5 The district court determined
ERISA precluded the participation of business owners in an ERISA pension
plan, and granted summary judgment in favor of the Fund. 36 Mr. Kwatcher
appealed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals.37
Mr. Kwatcher raised three issues on appeal. First, Mr. Kwatcher argued
that although he was an "employer," he also qualified as an "employee" under
ERISA, and therefore could participate in the pension plan. Second, Mr.
Kwatcher argued even if the court determined he was an "employer" under
ERISA, the Fund should pay his pension out of contributions made for the
period before he became the sole shareholder of Astor. Finally, if the court
determined that he could not receive any benefits, then the Fund must return
the contributions made by Astor on Mr. Kwatcher's behalf.38 This Note will
focus only on the first issue raised on appeal.
The issue before the First Circuit was whether the ERISA definitions of
employee and employer are mutually exclusive terms. 39 After examination
of ERISA's definitions of the two terms, the Kwatcher court reasoned if Mr.
Kwatcher is an employer he cannot be an employee. 4 The Kwatcher court
found that "[c]ongress intended [the definition of 'employee' at Section 3(6)]
to encompass those persons 'who ha[ve] the status of an "employee" under a

30. Id.

31. Id. Mr. Kwatcher was a member of Local 254. Id.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

39. Id. at 959. For the definitions of "employee" and "employer," see text
accompanying supra notes 27 and 28.
40. Kwatcher, 879 F.2d at 960.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

5

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 4 [1990], Art. 6

1026

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

collective bargaining agreement."' 4 Looking to this statement of congressional intent, and analogizing to the definition of employer under federal
regulation in the labor arena, the court concluded that "the 'employee' rubric
seemingly excludes management figures."4
The court found that
"'[e]mployee' and 'employer' are plainly meant to be separate animals."43
The court addressed whether "ERISA prohibits payments to [Mr.
Kwatcher] from a qualified plan." 44 The court noted under section 403(c)(1)
of ERISA, "[o]nce a person has been found to fit within the 'employer'45
integument, ERISA prohibits payments to him from a qualified plan."
Section 403(c)(1) provides: "The assets of a plan shall never inure to the
benefit of any employer and shall be held for the exclusive purposes of
providing benefits to participants in the plan and their beneficiaries and
defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan.""6 The court
determined that Mr. Kwatcher was an employer and that payment to Mr.
Kwatcher would constitute prohibited inurement of benefits to an employer. 4'
The court's conclusion that Mr. Kwatcher was an employer and its
conclusion that ERISA prohibited participation in a pension plan by an
employer are grounded in two arguments. The court placed support on the
applicability of 29 C.F.R. section 2510-3.3(c)48 and on the policy behind
ERISA.49
The court cited the regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor
under the authority of ERISA section 505:50 "An individual and his or her
spouse shall not be deemed to be employees with respect to a trade or
business, whether incorporated or unincorporated, which is wholly owned by

41. Id. at 959 (citing H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in

1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4639,4648; S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 15, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 4838, 4851).
42. Id. at 960. The court makes an analogy to the definition of employer as
interpreted by the First Circuit under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. (citing
Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1983)).
43. Id. at 959.

44. Id. at 960.
45. Id, Section 403(c)(1) is codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c) (1985).
46. Kwatcher, 879 F.2d at 960. The court states a belief that the anti-inurement
provisions and Part I's definition of "employer" are to be read together: "Read fully
and in context, ERISA's background demonstrates that the anti-inurement caveat and
Part I's expansive definition of "employer" are not mere window dressing." Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 961-62.
49. Id. at 960-63.
50. Id. ERISA § 505 is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1135 (1985).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/6
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the individual or by the individual and his or her spouse ... ."S' The court
interpreted this regulation as prohibiting the participation of a sole-shareholder
in a pension plan because of the sole-shareholder's status as an "employer." '
The court construed this Department of Labor regulation "to ban owneremployees from plan participation."53
Mr. Kwatcher argued against the above interpretation of the statutory and
regulatory language. The court recognized that the result of "block[ing]
pensions for owner-operators would disserve Congress' overriding goal of
'provid[ing] the maximum degree of protection to working men and women
covered by private retirement programs." 54 The court decided, however,
Congress had "ensured that working proprietors-incorporated or not--could
make tax-favored retirement arrangements despite their exclusion from
ERISA-qualified pension plans. 5 5 The court stated, "Any expectations
[Kwatcher] developed must yield both to the strong public interest in keeping
a principal ERISA safeguard intact, and to the perhaps
prosaic (but still
56
powerful) interest in maintaining the Fund's solvency.
The legislative history of ERISA revealed congressional intent "'to insure
that employer contributions are only for a proper purpose and... that the
benefits from the established fund reach only the proper parties." 57 The
anti-inurement rule was one of several basic fiduciary rules directed at
providing "adequate safeguards" against the use of the reserves of funds for
the benefit of the employer. 58 The court concluded that "[a]ll in all, the
legislative history leaves little doubt that the anti-inurement rule should be
construed to keep as strict a separation as practicable between employers and
the funds set aside to benefit employees.
The court cited Peckham v. Board of Trustees,6° a United States Court

of Appeals case which held dual-status individuals ineligible to participate in

51. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(c)(1) (1988).
52. Kwatcher, 879 F.2d at 961.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 962 (citing S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 18, reprintedin 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4850, 4850).

55. Id. The tax-favored retirement arrangements to which the court refers are the
Individual Retirement Account (IRA) and Keogh plans. Id.
56. Id. at 963.
57. Id. at 961 (citing Moglia v. Geoghegan, 403 F.2d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 919 (1969)). Moglia dealt with an interpretation of § 302 of the
Labor-Management Relations Act which the anti-inurement principle in ERISA
paralleled. See Moglia, 403 F.2d at 114-15.
58. Kwatcher, 879 F.2d at 960-61.
59. Id. at 961.
60. 653 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1981).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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an ERISA-regulated pension plan.6' In Peckham, sole proprietors sued the
pension plan to force payment of pension benefits based on the contributions
to the plan made on behalf of the sole proprietors as employees.6' The
Tenth Circuit held "dual-status individuals are not eligible for inclusion in
employee pension benefit plans."'63 The Kwatcher court did not recognize
any distinction between a dual-status individual who is a sole proprietor, and
one who is a corporate owner-employee.64 The authority of Peckham is
therefore questionable on the issue of ERISA's treatment of dual-status
individuals where the dual-status individual is a corporate owner-employee.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Mr. Kwatcher's claim for
retirement benefits from the Fund concluding "sole shareholders" are
"employers," and therefore cannot be "employees" for the purposes of plan
participation.'
III. ANALYSIS
The Kwatcher court's analysis of the status of a sole shareholder for
determining that individual's eligibility to receive pension payments is divided
6
into four sections. The court first looked to the language of ERISA. 6
Although the court found "the words of ERISA, and the casement in which
they are set, go a long way toward resolving the central question,, 67 the
language of ERISA is arguably ambiguous for determining the participant
status of a sole shareholder who is also an employee of the corporation. The
First Circuit next looked to extrinsic aids "[a]s a check upon [its] reading of
the statute."58 The two main tenets of the First Circuit's argument that Mr.
Kwatcher was an employer are 29 C.F.R. section 2510.3-3(c)(1), which the
61. Kwatcher, 879 F.2d at 959.
62. Peckham, 653 F.2d at 425-26.

63. Id. at 427. The court in Peckham cited to the Department of Labor
Regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(c)(1) to support its conclusion that dual status
individuals are excluded from participation under this regulation. Kwatcher, 879 F.2d
at 427.
64. In Kwatcher, because Mr. Kwatcher operated Astor in the corporate form, he
should have been able to take advantage of the separate entity theory of business
organization. That is, Mr. Kwatcher should have been found to be employed by an
entity separate from himself-the corporation. See Kwatcher, 879 F.2d at 958. In
Peckham, the petitioners were sole proprietors. There is no authority to support a
treatment of the proprietorship as an entity separate from the sole proprietor. See
Peckham, 653 F.2d at 427.
65. Peckham, 653 F.2d at 427.

66. Kwatcher, 879 F.2d at 959-60.
67. Id. at 959.
68. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/6
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court interpreted as a prohibition against the participant status of a sole
shareholder, and the legislative history. Once the court determined that Mr.
Kwatcher was an employer, it denied him participant status with support from
the anti-inurement regulations.
1. Ambiguous Treatment of Dual-Status
Individuals under ERISA
The Kwatcher court concluded the "words of ERISA, and the casement
in which they are set, go a long way toward resolving the central question
before us." 69
In 1988, the Eastern District Court of California addressed the same
question faced by the Kwaicher court: What is the status of a sole shareholder
for determining eligibility for pension benefits under an ERISA-regulated
plan? The facts of Dodd v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.7" are
similar to the facts of the Kwatcher case. John C. Dodd and his wife were the
sole shareholders of James C. Dodd & Associates, Inc., a California
corporation." The corporation participated in a group health plan ("Plan")
issued by John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co..7 2 Mrs. Dodd suffered
a stroke, and Mr. Dodd presented a claim for disability payments to the
Plan.?3 The Plan refused to make payments, and Mr. Dodd brought suit in
state court.74 The Plan removed the action to the Federal District Court for
the Eastern District of California. 75
Mr. Dodd argued against the removal to federal court because he could
pursue more favorable remedies in state court.76' Therefore, he argued the

69. Id.
70. 688 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Cal. 1988).
71. Id. at 565.
72. Id. The Plan was administered by the California Council of the American
Institute of Architects. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.

75. Id. Mr. Dodd's state law claim alleged violation of various state statutes and
certain common law rights. Id. Mr. Dodd opposed removal to federal district court
presumably because state law provided a broader relief-tort law-than that provided
under ERISA. Id. at 568.
76. Id. In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insur. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985),
the Supreme Court held that extra-contractual damages were prohibited when the
participant sues for equitable relief under 29 U.S.C. § 1109. 473 U.S. at 144. The
Dodd court, applying the analysis of Russell, held that Mr. Dodd's claim under 29
U.S.C. § 1132 for benefits was limited to the remedies available under ERISA. Dodd,
688 F. Supp. at 572.
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Plan was not an ERISA-qualified plan, and even if it was, Mr. Dodd was not
a participant within the meaning of ERISA. 77 The question of whether Mr.
Dodd was a participant under ERISA is the same question faced by the First
Circuit in Kwatcher7
The Dodd court found the legislative history non-dispositive. 79 The
court in Dodd examined the statutory language beginning with the definition
of a participant."0 The court noted Mr. Dodd "is only a participant in the
plan if he is an employee."8 ' After reviewing the statutory language defining
employee82 and employer,8 3 the court stated that "the definitions do not
preclude the possibility that an individual may have dual-status as both
employer and employee, nor do they define precisely whether owners and
stockholders of corporations are employees, employers or both."' The court
found ambiguity in the terms employee and employer."
The court looked to the legislative history of ERISA but found that
source "non-dispositive. '86 The court concluded that "the legislative
history... does not resolve the issue at bar, [yet] it does suggest that owners
of corporations were not necessarily within the class to be protected by the
statute."8 7
The test for whether an individual is an employer under ERISA is twopronged: Is the individual a person within Section 3(9) of ERISA, and does
the individual act directly, or "indirectly in the interest of an employer in
relation to an employee benefit plan"?ms The language defining an employer
as one who acts "in the interest" of an employer is ambiguous. Applying the
literal language of section 3(9), the category of employer might include "the
77. Kwatcher, 879 F.2d at 566. This Note only addresses the question of whether
a sole shareholder of a corporation qualifies as an "employee" for the purpose of
receiving benefits from an ERISA plan.
78. See id. at 959.
79. Dodd, 688 F. Supp. at 569.
80. Id. at 568-69 (citing ERISA § 3(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (Supp. 1989)); see
text accompanying supra note 26 for the language of ERISA § 3(7).
81. Dodd, 688 F. Supp. at 569.
82. Id. (citing ERISA § 3(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (Supp. 1989); see text
accompanying supra note 27 for the language of ERISA § 3(6).
83. Id. (citing ERISA § 3(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5) (Supp. 1989)); see text
accompanying supra note 28 for the language of ERISA § 3(5).
84. Dodd, 688 F. Supp. at 569.
85. Id.

86. Id.
87. Id.

88. ERISA § 3(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5) (Supp. 1989). See Note, Interpreting
ERISA: CorporateOfficer Liability for Delinquent Contributions,1987 DuKE L. J.

710, 715.
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payroll accountants who post the contributions, the comptroller or financial
officers who transfer funds and even the personnel manager" because all act
directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer as to a pension plan. 9
The language of sections 3(5) and (9) is also ambiguous because it fails to
consider the situation where a sole shareholder desires participant status in the
corporation-sponsored pension plan. The Kwatcher court reasoned that
because the definition of an employee is "any individual employed by an
employer," the terms employee and employer are "plainly meant to be separate
"animals."90 This statement does not 'address the issue: If a sole shareholder
can be an employee of the employer corporation, can the sole shareholder be
a participant in an ERISA plan?
2. Defining Employer
a. 29 C.F.R. 2510.3-3(c)(1)
Title 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3 seeks to define the scope of the term
"employee benefit plan." 91 Paragraph (c) states, "[a]n individual and his or
her spouse shall not be deemed to be employees with respect to a trade or
business, whether incorporated or unincorporated, which is wholly owned by
the individual and his or her spouse."9 2 The Dodd court, in addressing the

applicability of 29 C.F.R. section 2510.3-3, recognized "the regulatory
definition of employees expressly limits itself to the purposes of the
regulation, i.e., clarifying the definition of employee benefit plan."9 3 Title
I of ERISA is designed to protect employee benefit rights. 9' The express
purpose of Title I is to provide "minimum standards ...

assuring the equitable

soundness."'95

character of such plans and their financial
Regulation 2510.3-3
defines "employee benefit plan" for Title I.'
The regulation discusses plans without employees which are not
"employee benefit plans," 97 and plans with employees which are not
"employee benefit plans."98 The regulations identify those employee-

89.
90.
1989)).
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Note, supra note 88, at 716.
Kwatcher, 879 F.2d at 959 (citing ERISA § 3(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (Supp.
29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(a) (1988).
Id. § 2510.3-3(c)(1).
Dodd, 688 F. Supp. at 570.
ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1982).
Id.
29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(a) (1988).
Id. § 2510.3-3(b).
Id. § 2510.3-3(c).
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employer relationships which require federal regulation to assure equitable
treatment of employees and the financial soundness of plans. 9 The regulation defines relationships which should be excluded from Title I coverage
based on the determination that "abuse is unlikely."' 00
The Secretary of Labor, in promulgating 29 C.F.R. section 2510.3-3(c),
discussed the purpose behind the regulation:
[TI]he exclusion of sole proprietors and their spouses from the
definition of 'employee' has been extended to sole proprietors of
incorporated as well as unincorporated trades or businesses, since
the risk of abuse in the case of a plan covering only an incorporatedsole proprietorand his or her spouse is no greater than in

the case of a plan covering only an unincorporated sole proprietor and his or her spouse.' 0 '

The types of plans to which Title I coverage applies are those which do not
require federal regulation to assure equitable treatment of employees. Any
justification for the sole proprietor exclusion exists only if the exclusion
applies solely to those plans which have no other employees but the sole
proprietor and his or her spouse. There is no other explanation why abuse is
unlikely in such situations. The regulation cannot apply to sole shareholders
of corporations where, as in Kwatcher, the corporation employs individuals
other than the sole shareholder.
b. Policy
Congress enacted ERISA to "provide the maximum degree of protection
10 2
to working men and women covered by private retirement programs."
The general rule, under the regulations of ERISA, is protection of the reliance
of workers on promises contained in the pension contract between the
employer and the employee. 0 3 The Kwatcher court finds the exclusion of

99. 40 Fed. Reg. 34,526 & 34,528 (1975). Under 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(c) certain
employee-employer relationships are excluded from coverage under Title I: the

"consideration on which the exclusion ... [is] based-that abuse is unlikely-is

applicable." Id.
100. 40 Fed. Reg. 34,526 & 34,528 (1975).

101. Id.
102. S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 18, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4838, 4854. The appellant argued that this language
prohibited the exclusion of a sole shareholder from participant status. Kwatcher, 879
F.2d at 962. The Kwatcher court, in addressing this argument, states, "We understand
the lyrics, but think the music is out of tune." Id.
103. S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 18, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/6
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a sole shareholder from participant status supported by Congress' "refin[ing]
and deliver[ing] a wide variety of retirement savings options along with the
'
ERISA package."'O
This argument is a negative inference: Given the
existence of other retirement savings vehicles available to sole shareholders
as employers, one infers Congress intended exclusion of the sole shareholder
from the definition of participant for purposes of participation in employee
benefit plans.105
Another way of phrasing this argument is that the sole shareholder is
excluded from participation status because Congress did not specifically
include the sole shareholder as eligible for participation. Yet, there are
multiple references to sole shareholder participants in the legislative history
of ERISA and in the, pension regulation legislation before and after the
enactment of ERISA. Pension legislation history reveals Congress' desire to
allow the sole proprietor the same benefits available to the sole shareholder
of a corporation since the two types of business organizations are so similar.
This desire for equal treatment of the two types of employee-owners is
tempered by Congress' concern that the retirement savings plans of selfemployed individuals are subject to more abuse than plans maintained by a
corporation.'
The history of the tax treatment of the self-employed
persons' retirement savings plans reveals the existence of retirement savings
plans for the benefit of sole shareholders of corporations. The need to enact
legislation for the benefit of the sole proprietor was premised on the longstanding inclusion of sole shareholder-employees among the participants of
qualified pension, profit-sharing, stock-bonus and annuity plans.
In 1962, Congress enacted the Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement
Act of 1962 (1962 Act). 10 7 Prior to the 1962 Act, self-employed individuals
had no incentive to establish voluntary retirement plans outside the corporate
form because the self-employed individual could not obtain the tax benefits
awarded such corporate plans.' °8 Tax benefits available to employers who
established a qualified plan were threefold: immediate deduction by the

CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4838, 4854.

104. Kwatcher, 879 F.2d at 962.

105. The other retirement savings vehicles to which the Kwatcher court refers are
the IRA and the Keogh plans. Id.
106. See S. REP. No. 992, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprintedin 1962 U.S. CODE
& ADMIN. NEws 2964, 2966.
107. Act of October 10, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-792, reprintedin 1962 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMiN. NEws 945. The 1962 Act enacted House Resolution 10, and the
CONG.

retirement savings plans that were created under its provisions are commonly referred
to as H.R. 10 plans.
108. See S. REP. No. 992, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIi. NEWS 2964, 2964.
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employer of the amount contributed to the plan for employees, tax-free
treatment of the earnings of the plan's fund of contributions, and deferral of
taxation on employees' income until actual distribution of the amounts
received under the plan-both contributions to and earnings from the
plan."°
Generally, for a retirement plan to qualify for favorable tax
treatment, it must be established for the exclusive benefit of employees or
beneficiaries of employees. 1
The 1962 Act inserted provisions into the Internal Revenue Code to allow
the creation of trusts for self-employed individuals which would qualify for
the triple tax benefits associated with qualified trusts.'
These plans have

109. See J. LANGBEIN AND B. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 7075 (1990).
110. See S. REP. No. 992, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2964, 2972. Although the fact that the plan is established and
maintained for the exclusive benefit of the participants is the general concept, for
qualification of a retirement plan at this writing, the Internal Revenue Code also
demands compliance with standards relating to minimum participation, nonforfeitability
of pension rights, contribution limits, fiduciary responsibilities, and nondiscrimination,
See generally I.R.C. §§ 401-419 (1989); J. LANGBEIN AND B. WOLK, supra note 109,
at 70-75.
111. See S. REP. No. 992, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2964, 2971. House Resolution 10 established I.R.C. §§
401(d), (e) setting out requirements for qualification for plans which benefit
employees, "some or all of whom are owner-employees." I.R.C. § 401(d), Pub. L. No.
87-792; reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs (76 Stat.) 945, 948.
These qualifications were in addition to the requirement that the plans established
under H.R. 10 meet the criteria under § 401(a) (relating to the general qualification
requirements for qualified status of retirement savings plans). Id. Plans established
for the benefit of owner-employees, if they met both sets of criteria, would qualify for
the triple tax benefits afforded qualified plans under I.R.C. § 401 (immediate
deductibility of amounts contributed by the employer to a retirement savings plan, taxfree treatment on earnings from the trust established pursuant to such plan, and taxdeferred treatment of the amounts contributed to the plan on behalf of the employee).
Id.
Section 401(d) set out eleven characteristics of a qualified plan which any
retirement savings plan benefitting owner-employees must meet before qualified status
could be achieved. Section 401(e) set up special restrictions regarding excess
contributions to the plan made on the behalf of owner-employees. Id. at 948-52. A
summary of the provisions relating to H.R. 10 plans is contained in S. REP. No. 992,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-26, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
2964, 2988-89.
The major characteristics of H.R. 10 relating to owner-employee and selfemployed individual's plans required that all employees covered under the plan were
100% vested at the end of three years of service with the employer, revised the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/6
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come to be known as H.R. 10 plans. The legislative history of the 1962 Act
states that "[t]he primary reason for the [1962 Act] is to ...correct a
discrimination in the present law under which self-employed individuals-sole
proprietors and partners-are prevented from participation in retirement plans
established for the benefit of their employees although owner-managers of
corporations may do so.''n 2
In drafting the 1962 Act, Congress was concerned that the smaller size
of the plans developed by self-employed persons would "offer somewhat
greater opportunities for abuse than.., corporate plans covering many
employees."'
Thus, the provisions amending the Internal Revenue Code

definition of earned income as it relates to owner-employees for the purposes of setting
contribution limits, set the contribution limits for plans with participating owneremployees at 10% of the earned income up to $2,500, set a limit on the deduction of
contributions in the amount of 100% of the first $1,000 and 50% of the amounts in
excess of $1,000, and allowed for integration of the plan with social security subject
to limits on the variance between the total amount of retirement savings (contributions
under the plan and amount paid into the social security trust fund) of owner-employees
and the total amount of retirement savings for all other employees participating in the
plan. For a discussion of these provisions, see S. REP. No. 992, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
14, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 2964, 2980.
In addition to these restrictions, H.R. 10 addressed special rules for excess
contributions, limitations on the timing of benefit payments to owner-employees,
premature distribution penalties, lump sum distributions. See 1962 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 2981-87.
112. S. REP. No. 992, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in '1962 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2964, 2971.
113. See S. REP. No. 992, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprintedin 1962 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2964, 2966. Although the existence of this concern is
documented, the reasons for the concern remain obscure. Presumably, the concern
turned on the possibility of self-employed individuals operating essentially a retirement
savings account for themselves, and thereby qualifying for the triple tax benefits,
without providing retirement savings for their common law employees. The policy
behind allowing favorable tax treatment for qualified plans was to promote the use of
such plans as vehicles for encouraging persons to save for retirement years. See
generally J.LANGBEIN AND B. WOLK, supra note 109, at 70-75.
The theory underlying the use of favorable tax treatment for this purpose is
grounded on the classification of employees into essentially two groups: those who
have adequate disposable income to save for retirement, and those who must be cajoled
into saving money for retirement. Employees in the former group willingly reduce the
amount of their pay from an employer operating a qualified plan to gain the tax-free
treatment of income earned on the contributions made on their behalf to retirement
savings, and to gain tax-deferral treatment of those amounts. The cost savings which
accrue to the employer (in the form of reduced employee costs) are sufficient to allow
the employer to offer to employees in the latter group a retirement savings plans as an
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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to allow for the qualification of H.R. 10 plans were accompanied by special
standards relating to coverage, vesting, distributions, integration with social
security, employee contributions, plan trustees and employees under common
control." 4 Although the 1962 Act allowed self-employed individuals to gain
the triple tax benefits of qualified plans, it subjected those plans to more
stringent qualifications than those required of other types of qualified trusts.
Of particular concern to Congress in considering ERISA was the
inequitable treatment of self-employed individuals compared with the more
favorable treatment afforded owner-employees of closely-held corporations and
personal corporations. While there was "almost no practical limit on the
amount of pension contributions that closely held corporations [could] make
to qualified plans on behalf of owner-employees," 5 in contrast, the provisions relating to H.R. 10 plans set strict limits on the amount a self-employed
individual could contribute. Congress was convinced that the "basic situation
of certain proprietary-employees of closely-held corporations is so similar to
that of self-employed people that they should generally be treated like selfemployed people for pension purposes."01 6 Under ERISA, the goal was to
make "contributions on behalf of proprietary employees under closely held
corporate plans ... subject to the same general limitations as apply to selfemployed people.""' 7
To carry out this purpose, the ERISA amendments to the Internal
Revenue Code increased the deductions for amounts contributed to H.R. 10
plans." 8 The legislation was intended to provide that corporate proprietaryemployees "are limited to exactly the same deduction limitations as apply to
self-employed people."" 9 This purpose was carried out, in large part, by

incentive to employment. See generally Wolk, DiscriminationRules for Qualified
Plans: Good Intentions ConfrontEconomic Reality, 70 VA. L. REV. 419, 426-33.
114. S. REP. No. 992, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2964, 2966.
115. S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4890, 4892.
116. Id. at 9, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4897.
117. Id. at 29, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4912.
118. See id. at 9, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4897. This increase
was also made applicable to the equivalent in benefit levels. Id. The amendment
defined corporate proprietary employees to include only those individuals who own at
least two percent of the stock of the corporation and who together accounted for at
least 25% of the accrued benefits of all employees under the plan. Id. Further, the
deduction limitation applicable to contributions made by self-employed individuals
under an H.R. 10 plan was increased to fifteen percent of earned income up to $7,500
a year. ERISA also provided that portion of a self-employed individual's income
which could be taken into account for this purpose would be limited to $100,000.
119. Id. at 9, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4897-98.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/6
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12
adding Section 415 to the Internal Revenue Code pension provisions. '
Section 415 set limitations on the amount of contributions which could be
made on behalf of participants in defined contribution and defined benefit
12 1
plans.
H.R. 10 plans were still subject to special qualification requirements in
addition to the requirements applicable to more traditional employee benefit
trusts. In particular, an employer using the H.R. 10 plan was further restricted
in the amount of contributions or benefits which could be provided for a selfemployed individual and in the amount of compensation used to calculate the
benefit or contribution under the plan's formula. 122 The special rules for
H.R. 10 plans also required expanded coverage of eligible employees and
faster vesting for the rank-and-file employees. 123 These special rules did not

120. See TREASURY STATEMENT ON H.R. 6410 (TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL
RESPONSIBILITY Acr OF 1982 (TEFRA)) 4, reprintedin TAX MGMT. (BNA), series III,
vol. 4, at 129. This report stated that § 415 limits "were intended both to place a
ceiling on the retirement income that could be provided on a tax-favored basis and to
constitute a step toward parity between self-employed and corporate plans." Id.
In more detail, the report summarized the provisions of § 415:
Under Section 415 of the Code, the annual additions to a participont's
account under a defined contribution plan cannot exceed the lesser of
$45,475 or 25 percent of compensation. Annual benefits under a defined
benefit pension plan cannot exceed the lesser of $136,425 or 100 percent
of compensation. Post-retirement medical benefits can be provided without
reducing the dollar limit on benefits under a defined benefit plan. The
dollar limits for both defined contribution and defined benefit plans are
adjusted annually based upon the increases in the consumer price index.
When originally established in 1974, the dollar limits were $25,000 and
$75,000, respectively.

SId.

121. See I.R.C. § 415.
122. See DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 6410 (THE PENSION EQUITY Act OF 1982)
PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES, BY THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITrEE ON TAXATION 12,

reprinted in TAX MGMT. (BNA), series IV, vol. 3, at 125 [hereinafter DESCRIPTION OF
H.R. 6410].
123. Id. at 13, TAX MGMT. (BNA) at 125. The special rules applicable to H.R.
10 plans covered areas concerning coverage, vesting, distributions, integration with
social security, employee contributions, plan trustees and employees under common
control. See generally id. at 13-17, TAX MGMT. (BNA) at 125-26.
As an example of the special restrictions applicable to H.R. 10 plans, consider
the vesting requirements for H.R. 10 plans and traditional qualified plans. For
traditional plans, the qualification requirements as to vesting set out three alternative
minimum vesting schedules.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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apply to owner-employees of corporations nor to partners with a less than ten
percent interest in the partnership. 24
In 1982, Congress passed the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
(TEFRA), which addressed most of the remaining inequitable tax features
associated with the treatment of retirement savings plans of the self-employed
compared to the treatment of corporate plans.'25 The purpose of the pension
provisions of TEFRA was to "eliminate[] distinctions in the tax law between
qualified pension, etc., plans of corporations and those of self-employed
individuals, H.R. 10 plans." 126
TEFRA repealed certain qualification rules which applied only to H.R.
10 plans, extended other special qualification rules to all qualified plans and
provided that the remaining special qualification rules applied to plans,
whether maintained by corporate or noncorporate employers, which primarily
benefit "key employees."' 27 These top-heavy provisions, incorporating the

124. DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 6410, supra note 123, at 13, TAx MGMT. (BNA) at
125.
125. TREASURY STATEMENT ON H.R. 6410 (TEFRA) 1, 4, reprinted in TAX
MGMT. (BNA), series III, vol. 4, at 129. TEFRA provided for changes in the limits
on contributions and benefits, summarized by the Treasury Department Report as
follows:
1) The annual dollar benefit limits be decreased to $30,000 for defined
contribution plans and $90,000 for defined benefit plans;
2) Cost of living adjustments to the dollar limits would be eliminated;
3) Benefits to participants in multiple plans maintained by a single
employer could not exceed those available under a single plan;
4) Actuarial reductions in the maximum dollar limits on pension benefits
payable would be required if the individual retired before age 65; and
5) The dollar limits on maximum pension benefits would be reduced by
the value of post-retirement medical benefits provided under a defined
benefit plan.
Id. at 5, TAX MGMT. (BNA) at 130; see id. at 5-8, TAX MGMT. (BNA) at 130-31 for
further explanation of these provisions.
126. S.REP. No. 530, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 617, 621, reprinted in TAX MGMT.
(BNA), series III, vol. 4, 140, 142.
127. Id. "Key employees" were defined by TEFRA:
(A) IN GENERAL-The term 'key employee' means any participant in an
employer plan who, at any time during the plan year or any of the 4
preceding plan years, is(i) an officer of the employer,
(ii) 1 of the 10 employees owning (or considered as owning
within the meaning of Section 318, the largest interests in the
employer,
(iii) a 5-percent owner of the employer, or
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/6
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"key employee" distinction, were codified at section 416 of the Internal
Revenue Code. The top-heavy provisions impose standards which address
congressional concern over the potential abuse of smaller plans by selfemployed individuals. 1" The top-heavy provisions further provide that all
plans which skew pension benefits toward highly-compensated employees are

(iv) a 1-percent owner of the employer having an annual
compensation from the employer of more than $150,000.
For purposes of clause (i), no more than 50 employees (or, if lesser, the
greater of 3 or 10 percent of the employees) shall be treated as officers.
(B) PERCENTAGE OWNERS.Q) 5-PERCENT OWNER.-For purposes of this paragraph, the term
'5-percent owner' means(I) if the employer is a corporation, any person who
owns (or is considered as owning within the meaning
of Section 318) more than 5 percent of the outstanding stock of the corporation or stock possessing more
than 5 percent of the total combined voting power of
all stock of the corporation, or
(II) if the employer is not a corporation, any person
who owns more than 5 percent of the capital or
profits interest in the employer.
(ii) 1-PERCENT OWNER.-For purposes of this paragraph, the
term 'l-percent owner' means any person who would be
described in clause (i) if '1 percent' were substituted for '5
percent' each place it appears in clause (i).
(iii) CONSTRUCrIVE OWNERSHIP RULES.-For purposes of this
subparagraph and subparagraph (A)(ii)[sic](I) subparagraph (C) of section 318 (a)(2) [relating to
the application of aggregation rules] shall be applied
by substituting '5 percent' for '50 percent', and
(II) in the case of any employer which is not a
corporation, ownership in such employer shall be
determined in accordance with regulations prescribed
by the Secretary which shall be based on principles
similar to the principles of section 318 ....
TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 240(i)(2), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 519.

The principle reason for the creation of top-heavy plan provisions is to protect
against abuse of smaller plans by employers who skew the benefits toward themselves,
or other highly compensated employees. A plan is determined as top-heavy, generally,
if the accrued benefits attributable to the "key employees" exceeds the accrued benefits
attributable to all employees. Once top-heavy status is obtained, a plan must meet
requirements imposed by an accelerated vesting schedule, and a minimum benefit
provision, or suffer disqualification. See TEFRA § 240.
128. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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disqualified, unless the plan meets certain special vesting and minimum
benefits rules.'29
The tax treatment of retirement plans maintained by self-employed
individuals reveals Congressional concern that self-employed individuals
should be afforded the same favorable tax treatment in establishing retirement
plans as that afforded corporate owner-employees. The contention of the
Kwatcher court is that H.R. 10 plans are substitutes for other qualified pension
arrangements; the court states, "Conscious that ERISA would not cover
everyone in the workplace, Congress refined and delivered a wide variety of
retirement savings options along with the ERISA package."'130 Instead, it
appears from the brief summary above, that Congress acknowledged the
disparate treatment of self-employed individuals and corporate owneremployees and sought to correct that treatment in the 1962 Act, ERISA and
TEFRA. It is essential to note that in order for Congress to be concerned
about eliminating the inequitable tax treatment of the retirement savings plans
available to the self-employed, there must have been qualified retirement
savings plan options for the corporate owner-employee. The process of
affording self-employed individuals the same tax-favored treatment of
retirement savings plans available to corporate owner-employees demands the
existence of qualified retirement savings plans for corporate owner-employees.
Congress recognized the ability of owner-employees to participate in corporate
pension plans; there is no statutory authority preventing that participation.
c. Anti-Inurement
Section 403(c)(1) of ERISA contains the anti-inurement provision which
states that "the assets of a plan shall never inure to the benefit of any
employer and shall be held for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits

129. Present I.R.C. § 416(g)(1)(A) (1989) contains the present definition of topheavy status:
[T]he term "top-heavy plan" means, with respect to any plan year(i) any defined benefit plan if, as of the determination date, the
present value of the cumulative accrued benefits under the plan
for key employees exceeds 60 percent of the present value of the
cumulative accrued benefits under the plan for all employees,
and
(ii) any defined contribution plan if, as of the determination date,
the aggregate of the accounts of key employees under the plan
exceeds 60 percent of the aggregate of the accounts of all
employees under such plan.
Id.
130. Kwatcher, 879 F.2d at 962.
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to participants in the plan and their13 beneficiaries and defraying reasonable
expenses of administering the plan., '
Once the Kwatcher court determined Mr. Kwatcher was an employer, it
applied the anti-inurement provision of ERISA to deny his right to pension
payments. 3 The court stated, "Once a person has been found to fit within
the 'employer' integument, ERISA prohibits payments to him from a qualified
plan.', 133 It is not clear that Congress intended the anti-inurement provision
to deny benefits to any person who acts in the interest
to be applied blindly
13
of an employer. 1
In enacting ERISA, Congress was concerned with the conduct of plan
A major impetus to
administrators in operating the pension plans. 3
including fiduciary standards in ERISA was the disclosure of numerous cases
of abuse of the private employee benefit system. 136 ERISA targeted the

131. ERISA § 403(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (1986).
132. Kwatcher, 879 F.2d at 960.
133. Id.
134. ERISA § 3(5) defines employer as "any person acting directly as an
employer, or indirectly in the interest of an employer, in relation to an employee
benefit plan." ERISA § 3(5), 29 U.S.C. 1002(5) (1986). The Kwatcher court
determined that the definition of employee, "any individual employed by an employer,"
and employer were mutually exclusive. See supra note 90 and accompanying text;
employee is defined at ERISA § 3(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (1986).
As pointed out at supra note 89 and accompanying text, the literal application of
the employer definition would include "payroll accountants who post the contributions,
the comptroller or financial officers who transfer funds and even the personnel
manager" because all act in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee
benefit plan. Note, supra note 88, at 716.
135. See H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws, 4639, 4645.
1,36. The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, chaired by Senator
John L. McClellan, investigated the Allied Trade Council and Local 815 of the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters. The investigation revealed serious abuse in
the handling of employee benefit funds. See M. Gordon, "Overview: Why was
ERISA Enacted?," printedin U.S.. Senate Special Committee on Aging, The Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: The First Decade 1-25, 10 (Information
paper) (1984); J. LANGBEIN AND B. WOLK, supra note 109, at 518. The investigation
by the committee revealed that George Barasch, founder of the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, had manipulated and diverted the funds of the plans to the
end of making himself a prospective millionaire. Barasch, as the Trustee of the plan,
hired a consulting firm which he owned to manage the assets, and, at the time of the
committee's investigation, Barasch was in the process of transferring four million
dollars worth of assets of the funds to two "dummy" corporations owned principally
by Barasch. M. Gordon, supra, at 11.
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protection of the interests of participants of all employee benefit plans by
establishing standards of conduct for the persons managing the funds.137
Before the enactment of ERISA, legislation concerning certain forms of
employee benefit plans had implemented common law trust principles to
regulate the management of the retirement savings assets of the plans. 3 '
ERISA required the use of the trust form for the maintenance of assets of an
employee benefit plan.'39 Congress wanted to make clear that a participant
could rely on the traditional remedies of the common law of trusts to enforce
his or her rights under the plan.14 In hearings before the Committee on
Education and Labor, the Committee found that courts were "reluctant to
apply concepts of equitable relief' and refused "to disregard technical
document wording." 4' The combination of a lack of federal standards and
trust principles resulted in
the reluctance of courts to apply common 1law
42
plans.
the
in
"maladministration
widespread

A different aspect of fiduciary abuse was cited in the Interim Report of Activities
of the Private Welfare and Pension Plan Study, 1971. In that report, instances were
cited where a pension fund's assets were invested for the employer. The Woolworth
Company had invested over $39 million, or approximately 35 percent of the plan's
total assets, in its own real estate or in mortgages or in its own property. S. REP. No.
634, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1972).
137. See ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1986).
138. The Labor Management Relations Act implemented mandatory requirement
that employee benefit funds of multi-employer plans be placed in a trust form. LaborManagement Relations Act § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1986). The Internal
Revenue Code provisions relating to the triple tax benefits available to certain
employee benefit plans phrased the language for qualification in terms of trust
principles. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 219(f), 42 Stat. 247 (1921), 26 U.S.C.
§ 401(a) (1986).
139. ERISA § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1986).
140. See H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4643.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 10, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4648. The Committee

on Education and Labor identified four reasons for the codification of fiduciary
standards. First, the committee noted that many of the plans in existence were set up
in such a way that it was "unclear whether the traditional law of trusts is applicable."
Id. at 12, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4650. Plans such as insured
plans did not use traditional trust means of funding. Further, administrators of such
plans were subject to minimal or unclear state law standards. Id.
Second, the committee found that even in cases where traditional trust means of
funding were employed, "reliance on conventional trust law often is insufficient to
adequately protect the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries." Id.
Third, the committee found that participants were inadequately equipped to
safeguard their interests in the absence of "standards by which a participant can
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The fiduciary responsibility section of ERISA "codifies and makes
applicable to... fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of
the law of trusts."' 43 ERISA's fiduciary standards sections codified "[t]he
principles of fiduciary conduct ... from existing trust law, but with modifications appropriate for employee benefit plans."' 44 Under ERISA, every
fiduciary carries a twofold duty "to act in his relationship to the plan's fund
as a prudent man in a similar situation and under like conditions would act,
and to act consistently with the principles of administering the trust for the
Congress
exclusive [benefit of the participants and beneficiaries].' 45
viewed the enactment of these fiduciary standards as a codification of the
fidicuary principles developed in the common law of trusts.' 46

measure the fiduciary's conduct." Id.
Finally, the committee found the enactment of fiduciary standards desirable to
promote uniformity of decisions in an area that was increasingly interstate. Id.
143. Id. at 11, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4649.
144. Id. at 13, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 4651.
145. Id. The language of ERISA tracks this statement:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering
the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct
of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.
ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1986).
146. See H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4649; S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4838; see also Central States,
Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 522 F. Supp.
658, 665 (E.D. Mich. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 698 F.2d 802 (6th Cir. 1983),
rev'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 559 (1985).
In FirestoneTire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 109 S.Ct. 948 (1989), the Supreme
Court recognized "ERISA's legislative history confirms that the Act's fiduciary
responsibility provisions... 'codif[y] and make[] applicable to [ERISA] fiduciaries
certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts."' Id. at 954 (citing
H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 4639, 4649). The issue in Firestonewas the appropriate standard to be
used by federal courts in reviewing the decisions of plan trustees. In determining the
appropriate standard, the Court stated, "[W]e are guided by principles of trust law."
Id. See Austin, The Role and Responsibilitiesof Trustees in Pension Plan Trusts,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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One of the cornerstones of the fiduciary responsibility provisions of
ERISA is the "exclusive benefit rule," which provides "a fiduciary shall
discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries."' 47 The anti-inurement provision of ERISA
'
was enacted as a part of the "exclusive benefit rule."'4
The "exclusive

EQurrY,FIDUCIARIES AND TRusTs 111 (Youdau ed. 1989); Blass, ERISA:An Overview
for Uses-ERISA Cettarways,A.B.A.J. 72 (May 1989); Fischel and Langbein, ERISA's
FundamentalContradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1105
(1988).
147. ERISA § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1986).
148. Section 404(a) of ERISA states "a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with
respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and their beneficiaries."
ERISA § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1986).
Section 403(c) of ERISA states "the assets of a plan shall never inure to the
benefit of any employer and shall be held for the exclusive purposes of providing
benefits to participants in the plan and their beneficiaries." ERISA § 403(c), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1103(c) (1986).
Paragraph (1) of § 403(c) states the anti-inurement provision while paragraphs
(2) and (3) provide exceptions to the anti-inurement rule. Paragraph (2) states the antiinurement paragraph shall not apply in the case of an employer contributing to the plan
under a mistake of fact; paragraph (3) states the anti-inurement paragraph shall not
apply in the case of an employer contributing excessively to the plan. ERISA §
403(c)(2), (c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2), (c)(3) (1986). ERISA § 403(c)(2) states:
(A) In the case of a contribution ... made by an employer.., by a
mistake of fact, paragraph (1) [the anti-inurement provision] shall not
prohibit the return of such contribution to the employer within one year
after the payment of the contribution.
(B) If a contribution is conditioned on initial qualification of the plan under
section 401 or 403(a), of title 26, and if the plan receives an adverse
determination with respect to its initial qualifications, then paragraph (1)
shall not prohibit the return of such contribution to the employer within one
year after such determination ....
(C) If a contribution is conditioned upon the deductibility of the contribution under section 404 of title 26 then, to the extent the deduction is
disallowed, paragraph (1) shall not prohibit the return to the employer of
such contribution (to the extent disallowed) within one year after the
disallowance of the deduction.
ERISA § 403(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2) (1986).
Paragraph (3) of Section 403(c) states:
In the case of a contribution which would otherwise be an excess contribution (as defined in section 4979(c) of title 26) paragraph (1) shall not
prohibit the return to the employer of such contribution (to the extent
disallowed) within one year after the disallowance of the deduction.
ERISA § 403(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(3) (1986).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/6
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benefit rule" is a codification of the duty of loyalty found in the common law
of trusts.149
Under common law trust doctrine, the settlor of the trust could be the
sole beneficiary or one of several beneficiaries of the trust."' The employee
benefit trust, as to Mr. Kwatcher, is analogous to a trust created by the settlor
for the benefit of himself and other employee participants. The trustee of the
Fund is under a duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the
beneficiaries, of which class Mr. Kwatcher, as an employee, is a member.
Regardless of Mr. Kwatcher's status as an employer, if he is a participant, the
anti-inurement rule of ERISA does not prevent the payment of pension
benefits to him as a participant.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Kwatcher court is wrong to deny Mr. Kwatcher his retirement
savings. The analysis the court uses is flawed in four respects. The court
fails to recognize the ambiguity of ERISA's language in addressing the
participant status of an individual who is both the owner and an employee of.
a corporation. The Dodd court addressed the same issue in a better reasoned
opinion. The analysis which should be employed to address the participant
status of dual-status individuals should begin with a recognition of the
ambiguous language of ERISA."'
A court should recognize 29 C.F.R. section 2510-3.3(c) for its intended
purpose. The regulation was designed to define retirement savings plans
which would not be covered under ERISA because of the unlikely nature of
abuse within those plans." A court should also avoid drawing an inference
from the history of congressional legislation of the private pension system.

149. Under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (1959), "[t]he
trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest
of the beneficiary." Id.

150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 114 (1959) provides that "[t]he settlor
of a trust may be one of the beneficiaries of or the sole beneficiary of the trust."
Comment a states:
[A] trust may be created by a transfer inter vivos by the owner of property
to another person as trustee for the transferor or for a third person. The
transferor may be the sole beneficiary of the trust created by him, or he
may be one of several beneficiaries.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 114, comment a (1959).
The trustee may also be a beneficiary of a trust. The trustee/beneficiary is still
obliged to administer the trust for the sole benefit of the beneficiaries and to be
impartial as among all beneficiaries. A. ScoT, ScoTr ON TRUSTS § 115 (1960).
151. See supra notes 69-90 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 91-101 and accompanying text.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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The Kwatcher court infers from the existence of H.R. 10 plans that Congress
intended all corporate shareholders, if they desired to set up a retirement
savings plan for their benefit, to use the H.R. 10 plan.1 13 In fact, the H.R.
10 plan was intended as a retirement savings vehicle for use by soleproprietors in an effort by Congress to provide a retirement savings vehicle for
the unincorporated business owner parallel to that available for the incorporated business owner.' 54
Finally, whenever a court determines that an individual falls within
ERISA's definition of "employer," there should be hesitation before blindly
applying the anti-inurement provision of the act. The anti-inurement provision
of ERISA is one part of the codification in ERISA of common law principles
of trust law. Under common law, a person creating a trust could designate
himself as one of several beneficiaries. 5 5 So long as the ERISA safeguards
are available to protect the rights of the non-settlor beneficiary of the plan,
there is no rationale for denying the settlor-beneficiary the right to participate
in the plan.
MATrHEW J. FAIRLESS

153. See supra text accompanying note 55.
154. See supra notes 102-30 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 131-150 and accompanying text.
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